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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The brief of Appellees attempts to discredit plaintiffs' Statement of
Material Facts by stating the same is conclusory, nonobjective, unsupported and
misleading. The record reflects the defendants' overstatement. Defendants' fail to
cite a single incident that supports their claim that plaintiffs mislead the Courts.
The record is replete with references to defendants' multiple admissions of civil
and criminal violations of the laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles.
The record herein establishes that the material facts are clear, the law is
clear and the trial courts' application of the law to the facts of this case warranted
the imposition of liability upon the defendants as a matter of law. The trial courts'
refusal to follow the law or apply the law to the facts of this case warrants
reversal.
Contrary to defendants' assertions, the record is full of references to
defendants' abuses of their motor vehicle dealer's license and privileges. In
addition to the initial citations in appellants' brief each fact previously set forth is
supported by the following additional references in the record:
1.

Fact Number 1. (R. 184 - 188, 378.)

2.

Conover knowledge that he committed civil and crime violations of

the Motor Vehicle Act when he and Clark bought, advertised, displayed and sold
the subject vehicle from Clark's home. (R. 186, 277 - 281, 378, 385, 397, 419.)

3.

Clarks' conduct as an unlicensed, unbonded, motor vehicle salesman

in purchasing, advertising, displaying and selling the subject vehicle for Conover
from Clark's home. (R. 186, 277 - 281, 379, 391.)
4.

Old Republic Surety Co, dealer bond issued for the benefit of K & K

Sales covers losses suffered by reason of the principal's violation of any laws or
rules respecting commerce in motor vehicles. (R. 3, 61, 233, 378.)
5.

The defendants common enterprise acted as (a) a "Supplier" under

the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, and (b) a "Merchant" under the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code. (R. 218, 252 - 53, 276 - 82.)
6.

Defendants' admit to multiple civil and criminal violations of the

Motor vehicle Act when they induced plaintiffs' purchase by Clark's placement of
advertisements, displays and sale of the subject vehicle from Clark's home. (R.
252-53,276-82,373,375.)
7.

Conover at all material times owned the subject vehicle, allowed all

repairs to be performed in Conover/K & K's name and assisted in defrauding the
State of Utah of Sales Tax revenue. (R. 201, 276 - 82, 372 - 80.)
8.

Defendants did not properly, safely, completely, or professionally

repair the subject vehicle and sold the same with the incomplete, improper,
unprofessional and unsafe repairs that were concealed by the vehicle's exterior
skin and body parts. (R. 244 - 45, 248 - 49. 276 - 82, 366, 373 - 88,402, 403.)
9.

Clark failed to inform plaintiffs of the facts concerning the unsafe,

inadequate and incomplete repairs, which the defendants' knew existed.

Defendants controlled, contracted and paid for the repairs that were made. In
addition, Clark offered his personal guarantee that he (Clark) had properly
repaired the subject vehicle and that the same was safe and fit for use as a
passenger car and for plaintiffs' particular purposes. (R. 215 - 31, 245, 248, 252,
256 - 59, 276 - 82, 373 - 88, 391 - 97, 417 - 19.)
10.

Defendants knew the subject vehicle's crush zones, collapse zones

and structural integrity were not repaired or restored because they attempted no
such repairs to the subject vehicle.

The costs the defendants incurred in

connection with their repairs evidence the defendants' knowledge of the nature
and extent of their inadequate repairs. The defendants' hiding their incomplete
repairs under the subject vehicle's outer skin to hide their failures to remanufacture, re-construct and restore the subject vehicle to industry and
manufacturer's standards and specifications. (R. 215 - 31, 245, 248, 252, 256 59, 276 - 82, 373 - 88, 391 - 97, 417 - 19.)
11.

Clark personally financed, advertised, displayed and sold the subject

vehicle from Clark's home. Clark's advertising, display and sell of the subject
vehicle violated civil and criminal provisions of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act. (R.
215 - 31, 245, 248, 252, 256 - 59, 276 - 82, 373 - 88, 391 - 97, 417 - 19.)
12.

Following plaintiffs' decision to purchase the subject vehicle

Conover prepared all of the purchase documents. The purchase documents reflect
that K & K Sales owned the subject vehicle and that it was part of K & K Sales'
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dealer inventory. The sale documents wholly failed to reflect Clark's ownership
interest therein (R. 186,195 - 213, 370, 373 - 388.)
13.

Plaintiffs were subsequently involved in a minor accident. When

repairs resulting from the accident were attempted, the magnitude of the
incomplete, inadequate, unprofessional and unsafe repairs made by or at the
direction of the defendants became obvious when the subject vehicle's outer skin
was removed. (R. 215 - 19, 243 - 54, 370 - 71, 380, 402 - 03.)
14.

The subject vehicle was then disassembled for repairs and inspection

by the repair shop it had been taken to, by plaintiffs' insurance adjuster, by an
investigator from the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission and others. Each person who inspected the subject vehicle concluded
that the repairs made by or at the direction of the defendants were defective and
unsafe and that the cost of restoring the subject vehicle to safe operation exceeded
its fair market value. (R. 215 - 19, 243 - 45, 401 - 02.)
15.

Defendants' refused to take corrective action concerning their

breaches of civil and criminal provisions of their contractual duties owed by each
of them to plaintiffs and their breaches of the laws respecting commerce in motor
vehicles. As a result plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in order to obtain the remedies
provided by law. (R. 1 17,18 - 20, 95 - 112.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DEFENDANTS' ADMISSIONS OF MULTIPLE CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS RESPECTING
COMMERCE IN MOTOR VEHICLES HAS GIVEN RISE TO
PLAINTIFFS' PRIVATE, INDEPENDENT CAUSES OF ACTION
Appellants brief suggests that an appropriate theoretical approach to
deciding this case is to determine whether the statutes' upon which plaintiff claims
are based create independent or dependent causes of action. (Brief of Appellants
at 11 -12.) This Court's determination that consumers may pursue independent
causes of action against licensed and bonded dealers for multiple civil and
criminal violations of statutes would clearly define the public policy that governs
and controls the following acts:
1.

The Utah Motor Vehicle Act ("Motor Vehicle Act").

2.

The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("Sales Practices Act"), and

3.

The Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("Commercial Code").

The trial court determined that plaintiffs' claims and causes of action, based upon
the defendants admitted civil and criminal violations of these statutes, were
dependent and by themselves insufficient to afford any relief for their violation.
Plaintiffs believe that the statutes create independent causes of action based on the
following statutory language.
The Sales Practices Act, § 13-11-19(1), (2), (3) & (4) unconditionally
recognize that a consumer may bring an independent action regardless of whether
or not an adequate remedy at law exists. (R. 201, 254, 281, 282, 402 - 403.) The
defendants concede the "Sales Practices Act provides for the potential private
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enforcement of any violation of the Act." (See Brief Of Appellees at page 16.)
The Motor Vehicle Act § 41-3-205(2) & (3) provides for a cause of action against
licensed and bonded dealers together with an award of attorney's fees in cases
successfully prosecuted or settled against the surety or principal. § 41-3-210(1) (b,
c, d, i, 1, m, n), and (6) identify specific acts that are prohibited and which the
defendants admit violating. (R. 277 - 281.)
§ 41-3-401, enacted in 1991, is conspicuously missing from defendants'
Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale. (R. 196.) § 41-3-401(5) & (6) provide a cause of
action to enforce the rights and remedies provided for under this section in
addition to sanctions under §41-3-701. § 41-3-404 states that a person may
maintain an action against a dealer on the dealer's corporate surety bond. (R. 277
- 280.)

§§ 41-3-701 and 41-3-702 set forth the criminal and civil penalties

associated with the defendants' actions complained of herein. § 41-3-702 (l)(b)(i,
ii & iv), (c)(iv &vii) (4) and (5) state the civil penalty and the availability of a civil
action by a purchaser for violations set forth under subsection (1). (R. 233 - 236,
277-280.)
The Uniform Commercial Code, §§ 70A-1-203, 70A-1-205, 70A-2-102
through 70A-2-106 defines the scope, breadth and application of the same to the
facts of this case. (R. 223 - 230.) Defendants' concede that the Commercial Code
applies to plaintiffs' claims. (See Brief of Appellees at page 24.) The Honorable
Pat Brian properly applied Utah's statutory law to the undisputed material facts in
determining that plaintiffs claims for breach of contract, breach of express and

implied warranties and liability for inadequate repairs were factual determinations
for the jury to make. (R. 274, 374 - 381.) The Honorable Glen Iwasaki lacked
authority to overrule Judge Brian. (R. 374, 375, 380, 381.) Where the defendants
presented no new arguments or additional facts and did not correct their
contradictory and inconsistent statements, a sufficient showing of pretext was
established to have the jury decide which versions of defendants' facts, if any,
were to be believed. (R. 380, 381.)
This Court's ruling that one may pursue and maintain a private independent
cause of action should clarify the manner in which the laws applicable to
consumers are to be applied to consumer transactions. This Court's ruling should
plainly state the State's public policy as set forth in the statutes and as articulated
by the Utah Supreme Court. Woodhaven Apt v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918 (Utah
1997). Finally this Court should remind the district courts that Utah's public
policy, as expressed by Utah statutes, are to be followed and applied in consumer
litigation.
Alternatively, if it were determined that the statutes in question create
dependent causes of action, then it becomes necessary to identify what the statutes
are dependent upon in order to obtain relief thereunder. A ruling that the statutes
create dependent causes of action would effectively repeal them by judicial fiat.
Such a ruling would sanction the defendants' assertion that one may simply avoid
liability for shoddy, incomplete, unsafe and incompetent work by closing one's
eye's to the truth and claiming ignorance. (R. 382.) Haynes v. Manning, 917 F.2d
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450, 453 (101 Cir. 1990). Such a ruling would create greater incentives for
dealers, merchants and suppliers to hide and conceal material facts concerning the
products they sell thereby further polluting the stream of commerce and rendering
less merchantable their products' fitness for ordinary use and for one's particular
purposes. (R. 385.)(§§'s 70A-2-313, 70A-2-314 and 70A-2-315). This would
result in greater incidence of fraudulent and unfair sales practices.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURTS IGNORED STATE LAW WHEN
THEY IMPROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
Defendants' claim that plaintiffs' did not cite specific statutory provisions
or particular conduct in opposition memoranda filed with the Court is without
merit. (R. 172 - 179). The record speaks for itself. (R. 214 - 254, 275 - 282, 373
- 388, 417 - 419, as does the Reporter's Transcript Of Videotaped Proceedings,
dated April 16, 1998 pages 20 through 29.) Defendants' focus on plaintiffs'
complaint overlooks the obvious facts that were developed by means of
defendants' discovery responses and depositions in addition to the facts that were
known at the inception of the lawsuit. Defendants' assertion that plaintiffs offered
no facts or allegations that defendants had violated any statutes cited by plaintiffs
is likewise incorrect. (R. 214 - 254, 276 - 282, 373 - 397, 417 - 419.)
The record also contradicts defendants' claims that plaintiffs' brief for "the
first time in this litigation" alleged conduct, which if proven constituted violations
of the generally cited acts. (R. 95 - 102, 172 - 180, 184 - 188, 196, 200 - 203,

208, 215 - 231, 233, 237, 245, 248, 252, 253, 256 - 259, 276 - 282, 373 - 388,
391 - 397, 417 - 419.) The facts as presented and argued before the trial court
established that the defendants knew and the trial court was charged with notice
that plaintiffs' claims were appropriately set forth and the law applicable thereto
was clearly articulated. Discussions with defendants' counsel to withdraw their
improvident Order On Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dated
October 4, 1996 so that this case could be resolved in one trial were unfruitful.
Opposing counsel eventually conceded that plaintiffs' facts and legal arguments
were sufficient to sustain plaintiffs' claims on appeal.
" . . . 90 percent of what Mr. Martineau talked about [in argument to
Judge Iwasaki] had to do with things that Judge Brian has already
ruled upon. Judge Brian had every fact and plaintiffs had every fact
that was talked about right here before him at the time.
When plaintiffs' didn't like the form of the order they
objected. It was again argued and the Court signed the order as
stated with the findings.
This thing - frankly it's going to come back because - well, I don't
know if it will come back. It will be appealed. Prior to the judge
that Brian was told it was going to be appealed. I have a real hard
time with this matter getting tried twice now, going up on appeal and
perhaps coming back again to be tried a second time."
(See Reporter's Transcript Of Videotaped Proceedings, dated April 16, 1998
paged 28 & 29.)
POINT III
PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN
A PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER THE SALES PRACTICES ACT
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The record at 95 - 102, 172 - 180, 184 - 188, 196, 200 - 203, 208, 215 231, 233, 237, 244, 248, 252, 253, 256 - 259, 276 - 282, 373 - 388, 390 - 397,
417 - 419, reflects the lack merit in defendants' comment that plaintiffs' failed to
specify violations of the Sales Practices Act. The Sales Practices Act is not
complex, long or involved. The Sales Practices Act has only two sections, §§ 1311-4 and 13-11-5, that could possible apply to this case.
Count I, Intent To Defraud, and Count II, Tortuous Misrepresentations, of
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (R. 102, 103) go directly to the requirements of §
13-11-4. A prima facie violation of the Sales Practices Act is established by one's
showing that a supplier's acts were knowing, intentional or committed with intent
to deceive. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleged a prima facie case that raised
the inference of deceptive acts and practices as required by law. This inference
exists only because the statute presumes that a supplier's acts, if unexplained, were
more likely than not based on impermissible factors as enumerated in § 13-114<2)<a-o).
Plaintiffs met their burden of establishing a prima facie case when they
presented a preponderance of the evidence that supported their claims. Hqynes,
917 F.2d at 452. This should have resulted in a factual determination for the jury
to consider in deciding whether the defendants' reasons were legitimate or
pretextuaL

The Sales Practices Act does not impose rigid, mechanical or

ritualistic elements in creating a prima facie case. Neither should public policy
impose onerous requirements in order to establish a prima facie case.

Plaintiffs suggest that a sensible orderly way to evaluate and apply the
Sales Practices Act is to consider the evidence in light of common experience as it
bears on the critical questions set forth in the statutes and decisional law
construing it. Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 924 (Utah 1997) The specific elements
that must be then proven depend on the nature of the challenged act or practice
committed by the supplier.
Deceptive and Unconscionable Acts and Practices, Count III of plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint meets the requirements of § 13-11-5. Whether or not an act
or practice is unconscionable is for the court to determine after the parties have
been given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence to aid the court in making
its determination.

Plaintiffs' argued unsuccessfully to the trial court that the

defendants' multiple civil and criminal violations of the laws respecting commerce
in motor vehicles were per se unconscionable and deceptive act and practices.
Defendants' conduct also constituted negligence per se. (R. 281, 381 -388.)
Plaintiffs' twice briefed and argued to the trial court the facts and law
concerning defendants' misrepresentation concerning the standard, grade, and
quality of the subject vehicle. The facts are uncontested that the subject vehicle
sustained major damage to its structural integrity. That the defendants' did not
fully, professionally, or properly repair the subject vehicle's crush zones, collapse
zones or energy absorbing structural component parts. They left the floor pan
crumpled, the seat belt brackets cut and screwed to the floor instead of mounted in
the mounting brackets.
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More importantly, the plaintiffs' were given Clark's personal guarantee that
he had performed the repairs on the subject vehicle. Plaintiffs' believed they were
dealing with Clark as a neighborhood layperson and could only conclude that the
damages the vehicle had sustained must not have been that bad or Clark could not
have performed the repairs. The defendants' intent for criminally acquiring,
advertising, displaying, showing and selling the subject vehicle is a factual
determination for the jury to have made and not the trial court. (R. 274, 276 -82)
The defendants' intent was clearly for the jury to decide. The facts and
evidence that the jury would have considered in determining the defendants' intent
were the following, (a) Defendants' knowledge of the nature and extent of the
damage that resulted in the subject vehicle being declared a total loss salvage. (R.
396, 397) (b) Defendants' controls over the repairs they caused to be performed
on the subject vehicle. (R. 390, 395, 400, 401) (c) Defendants' controls over the
money they spent in repairing the subject vehicle's structural integrity, which in
this case amounted to a little over $900.00 in repairs to the unibody and other
major structural component parts. (R. 390, 395, 400, 401)

(d) Defendants'

controls in choosing and directing those whom they contracted to perform the
repairs in question. (R. 390, 395, 400, 401) (e) Defendants' illegal purchase (i.e.,
not paying sales tax on Clark's purchase), advertisement, display, and sell of the
subject vehicle. (R. 394, 395) (f) Defendants' concealment that Clark did not
perform the repairs as represented.(R. 393, 395) (g) Defendants' concealment of
the inadequate, incomplete, unprofessional and unsafe repairs. (R. 244, 392, 395,

396) (h) Expert testimony that adequate and safe repairs required much more than
the defendants spent on the subject vehicle, in addition to other evidence disclosed
in the course of discovery (R. 244, 248, 249, 334, 339).
Defendants' attempt to support the trial court rulings by referring to the "as
is" and "no warranty" disclaimer language. In considering defendants' defense, it
is significant that plaintiffs answered an advertisement placed by Clark. Plaintiffs'
then went to Clark's home to look at, test drive and more fully consider whether
the subject vehicle met their needs. (R. 276 - 282.) It was not until after the
agreement to purchase had been reached and the paperwork needed to complete
the deal that plaintiffs first learned that Conover was in fact the owner of the
subject vehicle. Assuming without conceding that these facts validate defendants'
disclaimer language, the disclaimer would only run in favor of K & K Sales, not
Clark or Conover in any event. Defendants' reliance upon the Federal Trade
Commission regulations is likewise misplaced.
16 CFR § 455.2(a) has nothing to do with the rebuilding, marketing or sale
of salvage motor vehicles. Neither does it address incomplete, unprofessional,
unsafe or damages that are concealed and not repaired. Nor does it preempt
Utah's health and safety standards such as § 41-3-210 (1)(1 - n), or Utah's motor
vehicle regulation (i.e., §§ 41-3-205, 41-3-210(l)(a - d), 41-3-701 and 41-3-7021,
4, & 5) in addition to others). Finally, federal law does not override the Sales
Practices Act 13-11-1 etc., or the duties, breaches of duties, and damages provided
under the statutes relied upon by plaintiffs herein.
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Defendants' next assert that they had no knowledge of defects in their
repairs prior to selling of the same to plaintiffs. (See Appellees Brief at page 19).
Plaintiffs' believe that the laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles impose
affirmative duties upon automobile dealers to discover defects. Haynes, 917 F.2d
at 453 (quoting Jones v. Fenton Ford, Inc., All F. Supp. 1328, 1335 (D. Conn.
1977). Defendants' knowledge or intent to deceive may be found where there was
a reason to know yet they failed to take reasonable steps to determine whether
their repaired were adequate. (R. 281, 381 -387.) Haynes, 917 F.2d at 453
(quoting Tusa v. Omaha Auto. Auction Inc., 712 F.2d 1248, 1253 -54 (8th Cir.
1983) andNieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640, 642 (5th Cir. 1978)). (R. 381 - 388.)
Defendants next state that there were no allegations or legal support that the
defendants had some unidentified duty to discover defects. {See Appellees Brief
at page 19.) The argument ignores allegations in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.
Under Utah law, to state a claim for misrepresentation, plaintiffs must allege:
"(1) one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction, (2) is in a
superior position to know material fact, and (3) carelessly or
negligently makes false representations concerning them, (4)
expecting the other party to rely and act thereon, and (5) the other
party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that transaction
"
Iadonza v. Mather, 820 F. Supp. 1371, 1384 (D. Utah 1993) (quoting Debry v.
Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008 (Utah Ct.App. 1992); Jardine v. Brunswick
Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967)).

Plaintiffs' Amended

Complaint taken at face value alleges each of these elements in the Common
Factual Allegations section thereof (R 98 - 192). Count IV, Breach of Express

and Implied Warranties, (R. 105, 106) and Count V, Breach of Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, (R. 106 - 108) restate plaintiffs' claims of that the
defendants misrepresented the subject vehicles condition and repairs. (R 274).
On a motion to dismiss a court cannot weigh the evidence as the trial court
did and determine that the statutes were not violated or that there was no evidence
that support their violation. These were questions for the trier of fact based upon
plaintiffs' actual reliance, the reasonableness of their reliance, the character of the
representations, and the circumstances of the alleged misrepresentations. Iadanza,
820 F. Supp. at 1384 (citing Condas v. Adams, 15 Utah 2d 132, 388 P.2d 803, 805
(1964); accord St. Joseph's Hospital and Medical Ctr v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 154
Arz. 307, 742 P.2d 808, 815 (1987); Stauth v. Brown, 241 Kan. 1, 734 P.2d 1063,
1068-69 (1987); Epperson v. Rolojf, 102 Nev 206, 719 P.2d 799, 803 (1986),
(Second) of Torts § 552 comment e (1977).
Defendants'

disclaimer argument does violence to the conceptual

foundation of a parties' duty to act in good faith in performing contractual
obligations. One's duty of good faith does not arise from the contract itself, rather
it is from the "overriding public policy in promoting the creation of and reliance
on contracts and the public's interest in promoting fairness and reasonableness in
commercial transactions." Iadanza, 820 F. Supp. at 1388. One's duty of good
faith "emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectation of the other party." Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
205 comment a (1981).
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The implied covenant does not arise from the express terms of the contract
as asserted by the defendants (Appellees Brief at page 25 - 27), "but from the
'grounds of justice that are independent of expressed intentions."' Iadanza, 820 F.
Supp. at 1388 (citing 3A Corbin on Contracts § 632, at 22 - 23 (1960). Breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to claims for breach of contract.
Id, Beck v. Farmers' Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985). One
complies with his duty to perform a contract in good faith, when his actions are
consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the
other party. Id. (Citing St. Benedict's Dev. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,
200 (Utah 1991).
Defendants' assertions that plaintiffs failed to introduce any factual
evidence to support their claims that the defendants' violated the Motor Vehicle
Act are simply false (Appellees Brief at page 20 - 22.) The record clearly sets
forth the facts plaintiff's alleged, introduced and argued. (R. 96 - 109, 185, 196,
200 - 203, 205 - 231, 233, 244 -45, 248 - 49, 253 - 253, 256 - 260, 274, 276 282, 373 - 380 and the exhibits attached thereto.) Defendants' reading of § 41-3404 as the codification of the common law tort of fraud overreaches. § 41-3-404
simply allows recovery for losses or damages suffered by reason of fraud,
fraudulent representation or violations of the laws respecting commence in motor
vehicles.
Common law fraud need not be proven in order to recover under § 41-3404. One need only show that in transacting any business with a licensed and

bonded motor vehicle dealer he or she suffered a loss. A review of the annotated
cases following § 41-3-404 reveals the inaccuracy and lack of merit in defendants'
assertions that common law fraud must be proven. The defendants' claims that
without fraud the multiple civil and criminal violations of Motor Vehicle Act
create no independent cause of action brings this Court back to plaintiffs' initial
suggestion that it is necessary for this Court to decide whether or not the statutes
create a dependent or independent cause of action. This issue appears to be one of
first impression in this jurisdiction.
The foremost rule in statutory construction is that the court "give effect to
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve." Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991) see also Savage
Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P. 2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991); American
Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P. 2d 1, 3, (Utah 1984); Marc Dev. Inc. v. FDIC, 111
F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (D. Utah 1991). Courts must "look at the plain meaning of
the language at issue to discern the legislative intent." Chris & Dick's Lumber v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1990).
The plain meaning of the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the
Commercial Code, defendants' Bond Of Motor Vehicle Dealer, Salesperson, Or
Crusher (R. 233) and other laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles does not
support defendants' arguments.

Neither are the purposes or intent of the

legislature achieved through defendants' narrow construction. Nor are defendants'
assertions that plaintiffs' failed to refer to applicable statutes well taken. The
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record at 96 - 111, 167 - 78,184 - 87, 196, 200 - 03, 215- 31, 233, 237, 244 -45,
248 - 49, 252 - 53, 256 - 70, 274, 276 - 282, 373 - 388 and the exhibits referred
to therein as well as the Reporter's Transcript Of Videotaped Proceedings, dated
April 16,1998 at pages 20 - 29 unequivocally contradict such assertions.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF'S INTRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR BREACHES OF
CONTRACT, EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES
The record is packed with references to the inaccuracy of defendants'
claims that plaintiffs omitted from the trial court the issues that are now before this
Court. (R. 95 - 102, 172 - 180, 184 - 188, 196, 200 - 203, 208, 215 - 231, 233,
237, 244, 248, 252, 253, 256 - 259, 276 - 282, 373 - 388, 390 - 397, 417 - 419).
All the Counts' in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint directly or indirectly dealt with
defendants' breaches of contract.

Count IV specifically alleged "Breach of

Express and Implied Warranties."
As with the Sales Practices Act and Motor Vehicle Act, it is the court's
duty to give effect to the statutory provisions requiring that the statutes be liberally
construed in order to achieve the statutes' objectives. Brickyard Homeowners'
Ass'n Man. Comm v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1983). § 1311-2 directs that the "act be construed liberally to promote" its policies. The cases
that construe § 41-3-404 require that this section be "construed broadly to protect
persons doing business with motor vehicle dealers. Western Sur. Co. v. Redding,

626 P.2d 437 (Utah 1981); Lawrence v. Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P.2d 619
(1956).
The Commercial Code has a similar provision as found in §§ 70A-1-102(1),
70A-1-103 and 70A-1-106. The issue of defendants' breach of contract was twice
briefed and argued to the trial court. Judge Brian's Minute Entry properly found
in part:
"Court hears argument from respective counsel Re: Motions (sic) for
summary judgment. Summary Judgment is denied. The Court finds
there is only one factual issue for trial and that is what seller
represented to buyer Re: The condition of the vehicle and repairs
that were made to the vehicle. The issue of punitive damages and of
fraud are dismissed . . . . "
(R. 274). Notwithstanding the limitations contained in Judge Brian's Minute
Entry the form of the Order presented for entry far exceeded the language, scope
and content of the trial court's actual ruling. For this reason plaintiffs' objected to
the form of the order (R. 275 - 283). All of plaintiffs' claims that related to
defendants' breach of contract remained intact following Judge Brian's ruling (i.e.,
Intent To Defraud, Tortuous Misrepresentation, Deceptive and Unconscionable
Acts and Practices, Breach of Express and Implied Warranty, and Breach of
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.)
Plaintiffs' have no dispute with defendants' "as is," "no warranty"
disclaimers to the extent such disclaimers are limited to the facts defendants made
known and disclosed to them.

Serious legal, moral and ethical problems are

presented however with defendants' attempts to disclaim liability for conditions,
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issues and defects they concealed, hid or intentionally failed to disclose. This is
even more true when one considers the serious safety issues that arise when an
unsuspecting and uninformed consumer buys a vehicle that was improperly,
unprofessionally, incompletely and dangerously repaired.
§§ 41-3-210(1X1, m, & n) 78-15-6, and 13-11-4(a, b, c, & e), 70A-2-303,
70A-2-313 (a & b), 70A-2-314, 70A-2-315 uniformly and consistently identify
and describe the acts, errors and omissions that warrant imposition of liability on
those who breach the duties assumed or imposed on those with superior
knowledge. Defendants' request that this Court relieve them of such liability.
POINT V
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' BREACHES OF CONTRACT,
AND WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS WERE ACCURATELY AND
FULLY BRIEFED AND ARGUED TO THE TRIAL COURT
The District Courts were presented with the facts, the law and the
arguments that accurately, fully, and properly present the legal consequence of
defendants' breach of contract as measured against defendants' warranty
disclaimers. (R. 215 - 231, 233, 237, 244 - 45, 248 - 49, 252 - 53, 255 - 73, 274,
276 - 82, 344 - 71, 372 - 407, 417 - 19).
The new issues and arguments raised by defendants' in their appellees
brief, pages 2 4 - 3 1 , concerning their breaches of contract and breaches of express
and implied warranties were already fully briefed to the trial court. In the interests
of avoiding duplicity, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court refer to the
following parts of the record:

1.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For

Summary Judgment, dated July 8,1996 (R. 214 - 254).
2.

Minute Entry, dated August 2,1996 (R. 274), and

3.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Second

Motion For Summary Judgment, dated March 16,1998 (R. 372 - 407.)
There are certain procedural and due process rights and principles that are
meant to govern and control litigation and trial court decisions while being
litigated. One such principle is that trial courts of comparable authority lack the
authority to sit as appellate courts on one another decisions.

Another such

principle is the Doctrine Of Law Of The Case. Plaintiffs' believe that the trial
court's handling of their claims violated these established procedural rights.
Plaintiffs' likewise believe that the trial court usurped the authority of the jury in
deciding the factual issues identified and presented in this appeal.

Finally

plaintiffs' believe that the trial court simply ignored the law or misapplied the law
to the undisputed material facts of their case.
The Honorable Pat Brian properly denied defendants' motion for summary
judgment and determined that factual issues warranted a trial to determine what
the sellers represented to the buyers concerning the condition of the subject
vehicle and its repairs. The facts and the law did not change. Accordingly the
Honorable Glen Iwasaki improperly overruled Judge Brian in making findings of
fact in connection with the dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should clearly state that plaintiffs' claims and causes of action
constitute independent basis for imposing liability. An opinion is sorely needed
that clearly sets forth the public policy of this State concerning the application and
construction of the laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles and their interrelationship. Such a decision would assist in establishing the minimum standards
motor vehicle dealers must adhere to and would result in greatly reducing the
deceptive and unfair sales practices that the defendants engaged in herein.
This Court should rule:

(A) That the defendants had positive non-

abandonable legal duties to know the physical condition of the subject vehicle at
the time it was sold by them to the plaintiff's and to honestly, fully, fairly and
timely advise plaintiffs of all relevant facts concerning such condition. (B) That
the plaintiffs are entitled to pursue each and all of the rights and remedies which
are expressly afforded them by the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the
Commercial Code, the Utah Administrative Code, the Dealer's Bond and the Sales
Contract. (C) That the Trial Court's award of costs was in error. And (D) that the
aforementioned Acts are to be construed liberally and broadly in favor of
consumers, such as the plaintiffs, to insure that the rights and remedies of the
consuming public are safe guarded and rendered effective and meaningful.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '$
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clay of March, 1999.

Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief Of
Appellants was served upon the following individual by mailing a copy thereof,
postage prepaid, to said individual at the following address this / f ^ d a y of
March, 1999.
T. Richard Davis
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
900 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
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